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process incorporates the concept of equal protection of the laws. 3
Again, the absence of legislative findings or a statement of legislative
policy is harmful to the validity of the act. Without it, one may assume
that the same considerations which led to exemptions under the federal
act were considered controlling under the state act. But this gives no
explanation for those exemptions in the state act which are not paralleled in the federal act. Also left for speculation is the effect of the
proviso rendering compliance with the federal act compliance with
certain crucial provisions of the state act. As mentioned above, the
purpose may have been to relieve employers from the burdens of
duplicate record keeping and duplicate pay computations. Or, it may
have been to preserve the interstate competitive position of Washington
employers. In either event, the substantial question remains whether
such a consideration renders classification on that basis reasonable for
the purposes of the test of equal protection of the laws.
Co--LIUs J. PECK

PROCEDURE
In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded-Force and Effect of Service
of Process Outside of State. Within recent years several state legislatures have enacted legislation extending the bases for jurisdiction over
nonresidents. The Washington legislature in Chapter 131 of the 1959
Session Laws has enacted a statute that is probably as comprehensive
as any to be found in the country.'
Section 1 amends RCW 4.28.180 which relates to personal service
out of state. Such service may be made upon any party. It is to be
noted that the word "party" is used, thereby presumably including
both individuals and corporations. Formerly, personal service outside
the state was only equivalent to service by publication. As a result of
the amendment, such service, if upon a citizen or resident of the state
or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the state, is
to have the force and effect of personal service within the state.
3

Bollng v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

I Chapter 131 is patterned after 110 Iii.. AwN. STAT. 16 and 17. The Illinois statute
is commented upon 50 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 599, 31 No=n DA~m LAw. 223 and 5 DE PAUL
L. REV. 106.
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Otherwise it shall have the force and effect of service by publication.'
As in the past, the summons upon a party out of the state is to contain the same matter and is to be served in the same manner as personal
service within the state, except that it is to require the party served to
appear and answer within sixty days after such personal service.
The provision to the effect that personal service out of the state
upon a citizen or resident of the state or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the state is equivalent to personal service
within the state, is new. Two major questions arise.
First, is adequate notice provided for? The due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment requires that the method of service employed be reasonably calculated to give the adverse party notice of
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.' There can be no
better method of notice than that of personally serving the adverse
party and, consequently, this should create no constitutional problem.
Secondly, in providing that personal service outside the state shall
be equivalent to service within the state in the specified instances, the
legislature has considerably extended the in personam jurisdiction of
the Washington courts. The question of the constitutionality of the
exercise of such jurisdiction arises. If "citizen or resident" is to be
interpreted to mean a domiciliary of Washington, then this is clearly
proper. In Milliken v. Meyer,' the Wyoming court was held to have
personal jurisdiction over a domiciliary of Wyoming who was personally served in Colorado.
It is suggested that this is the proper interpretation, at least in the
case of "citizen." While one may be a citizen of the United States and
be domiciled elsewhere, to be a citizen of a state of the United States
one must be domiciled in that state.' Thus, in the statute the term
"citizen" should be interpreted to mean a domiciliary of Washington.
2 Chapter 131, section 1 provides, "If upon a citizen or resident of this state or upon
a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, it shall have
the force and effect of personal service within this state; otherwise it shall have the
force and effect of service by publication." At the time that House Bill No. 58 was
enrolled the italicized words were omitted due to a clerical error. Since the legislature
had actually enacted the law with the italicized words included and the omission was
merely a clerical error, the bill was re-enrolled as it should have been in the first place
and was then signed by the Speaker of the House, President of the Senate and the
Governor.
Letter from the Office of the Secretary of State, dated June 8, 1959.
8
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1357 (1940), and
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 75 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
'311 U.S. 457 (1940); Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1357 (1940). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
5See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 80 (Tent Draft No. 4, 1957)
and 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 599, 610 (and cases cited therein).
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While domicile has a fairly settled meaning in the law, residence
can mean many things depending on the circumstances wherein it is
used and the purpose of the statute employing the term. Residence
can mean the equivalent of domicile, something more than domicile,
i.e., actual physical presence, or something less than domicile, i.e., a
dwelling place adopted for the time being but not necessarily with
such an intention of making a home there as to create a domicile.
Commonly, the term "resident" when used in a statute relating to
judicial jurisdiction is interpreted as requiring that the absent defendant be domiciled within the state.' This may well be the correct interpretation in the present statute.
Certainly, it would seem that since the purpose of the new law is
to increase the bases of jurisdiction of the Washington courts, residence
should not be interpreted to mean more than domicile. It either means
the same or less. Assuming it means less, while the United States
Supreme Court has not yet determined whether residence, as opposed
to domicile, is an adequate basis for judicial jurisdiction, several courts
have held that it is.' In either event then, whether residence means the
same as or less than domicile, the statute should be constitutional.
The provision that service outside the state upon a person who has
submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state shall have the
force and effect of service within the state can best be considered in
connection with section 2 of the session law. Section 2 adds a new section to RCW chapter 4.28, and enumerates those instances in which a
person is deemed to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Wash-

ington.
Subsection I of section 2 provides:
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts in this section enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this state;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any property whether real
or personal situated in this state;
6 For a discussion of the many meanings of residence see 6 VAND. L.REV. 561 and
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9, comment j, (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1954).

7Sampson v. Sapoznik, 256 P.2d 346 (Cal. D. Ct. App., 1953) ; State v. Heffernan,
142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145 (1940); Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Barbour, 66
N.J.L. 103, 48 At. 1008 (1901); Hetson v. Sommers, 44 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1943). See
also other cases cited in Reporter's Note to RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoONFLIcT OF
LAws § 79, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
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(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this state at the time of contracting.

The controlling principle relating to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction is set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington8 that,
"[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." In applying the rule requiring minimum
contacts it is essential that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.9 Operating under these guides, the statute should meet the
tests of constitutionality.
It is to be noted that jurisdiction under the statute extends only to
those causes of action arising from the acts enumerated therein. In
other words, it precludes a plaintiff from asserting a cause of action not
within the statute when jurisdiction is based upon the statute. This
comports with the concept of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,
supra, and Hanson v. Denckla, supra, that subjection of the defendant
to in personam jurisdiction is consistent with due process when the
action sued upon arises out of an activity carried on by the defendant
within the state.
Turning to the activities specified in the statute which constitute
submission to the jurisdiction of Washington, there is first the matter
of transaction of business within the state. What constitutes doing
business obviously will require statutory construction by the court in
the many diverse factual situations which may arise. Perhaps the
most that can be said generally is that the test is one of reasonableness,
keeping in mind that the legislature has intended to expand the jurisdiction of the Washington courts to the extent allowed by the Constitution1 0
Direct support may be found for the constitutionality of the provision that commission of a tort within the state subjects one to judicial
jurisdiction. Similar statutory provisions in Vermont11 and Mary:326 U.S. 310 (1945); Annot., 161 A.LL 1057 (1943).
9

Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).

10Fra discussion of "doing business"' as a basis for judicial jurisdiction see

STATEMENT (SE~coND), CoNmrLc

OF LAws

§§ 85, 92 (Tent Draft No. 3, 1956).

x

i Smyth v. Tivn State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt 569, 80 A.2d 664; Annot, 25
A.LR.2d 1193 (1951).
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land 2 have been sustained. More recently, the comparable provision
in the Illinois statute upon which the Washington act is based was
held constitutional. 3 The defendant, a resident of Wisconsin, was
engaged in the business of selling appliances. He sent one of his
employees to deliver a gas cooking stove to the plaintiff in Illinois. At
the employee's request, the plaintiff assisted in unloading the stove
from a truck. In the course of doing so, the defendant's employee
negligently pushed the stove so as to sever one of the plaintiff's fingers.
The defendant was served in Wisconsin in accordance with the Illinois
statute. It was held that the Illinois statute met the requirements of
due process in basing jurisdiction on the commission of the tort in
Illinois.
It is next provided that the ownership, use, or possession of real or
personal property is a basis for personal jurisdiction. Since one owning, using, or possessing property looks to the law of the situs for
protection of his property, it is reasonable that he should be subject
to that law for liabilities arising therefrom. A comparable Pennsylvania statute, relating to real property, has been sustained." While
there may be instances in which it would not be as reasonable to subject
one to judicial jurisdiction in the case of personal property as in the
case of real property because of the difficulty of control, i.e., theft,
the courts can maintain the proper balance, thereby upholding the
constitutionality of the statute generally.
Reliance can be placed upon McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co. 5
to sustain the provision that "contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting" subjects one to the jurisdiction of this state. A Texas insurance company
had insured a resident of California. The beneficiary brought an action
on the policy in California, serving the defendant company in Texas.
Though this was the only contact the company had with California,
it was held that the requirements of due process had been met. The
necessary "minimum contact" was present.
It is suggested that these new bases of jurisdiction should be applied to causes of action which have arisen prior to the adoption of
the statute. This would seem to be in accord with the intent of the
legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the courts. Moreover, the
12 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F.Supp. 654 (D.C. Md., 1950).
"3 Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
"4 Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938).

15 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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statute affects a change in remedy or procedure rather than the substantive rights of the parties involved. It serves to provide a Washington forum for whatever substantive rights may exist. Comparable
statutes have been so interpreted, and such application has been held
constitutional."
In other states with similar statutes the suggestion has been made
that in those instances where a court has jurisdiction, but where the
exercise of such jurisdiction would be unduly burdensome upon the
defendant or the court, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is available. This, of course, is not possible in Washington in view of Lansverk
v. Studebaker-PackardCorp., 7 which rejects that doctrine. It is possible that the court, in the words of the Lansverk case, might dismiss an
action under the statute because of a "manifest abuse of process" or
because the action offends the public policy of the state. What the
court had in mind by such language remains to be spelled out. It is
possible also that dismissal might be had on the basis of the doctrine
of comity. 8
In addition, when jurisdiction is based upon the statute, the nonresident defendant will probably in many instances have the privilege
of removal to a federal court.1 9 In such instances, after removal, a
motion will lie for transfer to a more convenient district.20
Section 2 of the session law further provides that service of process
upon any person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the state
may be made by personal service outside the state with the same force
and effect as though personally served within the state. This supplements section 1, previously discussed. There is the requirement, however, that in those instances wherein jurisdiction is based on section 2
of the session law, in order for service outside the state to be valid,
there must be an affidavit made and filed to the effect that service
cannot be had within the state. It is to be noted that this requirement
does not apply to the more general amendment to RCW 4.28.180 in
section 1 of the session law, allowing for service out of state.
In the event the defendant is personally served outside the state on
the causes of action enumerated in section 2 and the defendant prevails, he may be allowed a reasonable amount as attorney's fees as
,1 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Nelson v. Miller, 11
Ill2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
17 154 Wash. Dec. 114, 338 P.2d 747 (1959).
18 See Olympic Mining & Milling Co. v. Kerns, 64 Wash. 545, 117 Pac. 260 (1911).
1962 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1952).
20 62 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952).
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part of the cost of defending the action. The final provision is that
this new statute is no way limits or affects the right to serve process in
any other manner provided by law.
By this act the Washington legislature has evidenced its intent to
expand the in personam jurisdiction of its courts to the limits permitted under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It
is this concept which must be recognized by the attorneys and the
courts of the state in interpreting and applying the statute.
Court Costs in Actions by and Against State or County. Chapter
62 of the 1959 Session Laws amends RCW 4.84.170 to read as follows:
"In all actions prosecuted in the name and for the use of the state, or
in the name and for the use of any county, and in any action brought
against the state or any county, and on all appeals to the supreme
court of the state in all actions brought by or against either the state
or any county, the state or county shall be liable for costs in the same
case and to the same extent as private parties." The italicized phrases
have been added to the original statute.
Perhaps the leading case interpreting RCW 4.28.170 is Washington
Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst.' The state was defendant in the superior
court. Following an adverse judgment, the state appealed to the
supreme court, which affirmed. The private party sought to obtain
costs against the state. The general doctrine was first stated that costs
are purely statutory, and thus a sovereign state in actions in which it
is a party is not liable for costs in the absence of an express statute
creating such liability. Since the statute provided for costs against the
state only in actions "prosecuted in the name and for the use of the
state," there could be no recovery of costs where the state was a
defendant in the superior court. The state did not become the plaintiff
within the meaning of the statute by appealing. If costs were to be
taxed against the state when it was a defendant, it was for the legislature to say so.
In Lake & Co., Inc. v. King County actions were brought against a
county. Judgment was for the plaintiff and the county appealed. The
supreme court affirmed, and the plaintiff sought to obtain costs against
the county. Relying upon the Ernst case the court concluded that just
as RCW 4.84.170 did not allow the taxing of costs against the state
I 1 Wn.2d 545,97 P.2d 116 (1939).

24 Wn.2d 651, 104 P.2d 599 (1940).
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when the state was a defendant, likewise the same rule applied to
counties.
It would appear that under the statute as amended costs would now
be allowed the private party in both of these cases. By the amending
clauses the state and counties are liable for costs when they are defendants as well as when they are plaintiffs. Furthermore, they are
liable for costs on appeal to the supreme court regardless of whether
they are plaintiff or defendant.
One word of caution might be appropriate. The statute does not
purport to affect the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The statute does
not constitute a general consent to be sued by the state. It is simply a
provision that in those instances in which the state or counties are
proper parties, they shall be liable for costs to the same extent as
private parties.
Jurors' Fees. Chapter 73 of the 1959 Session Laws amends RCW
2.36.150 to provide that jurors' fees in the superior courts shall be ten
dollars per day instead of five dollars. This is in recognition of the
fact that the old rate of compensation worked a real hardship on
conscientious citizens who were called for jury service and who made
no objection. The old rate also undoubtedly resulted in requests for
excuse from service by other equally conscientious citizens who simply
could not afford the financial sacrifice. Though the increase will be
welcomed, one may question whether it is adequate. The Judicial
Council, for example, had recommended that the compensation of
jurors be increased to fifteen dollars per day. The compensation for
jury service before a justice of the peace court and upon a coroner's
jury remains the same, four dollars per day. Likewise, there has been
no change in the mileage rate of ten cents per mile.

Plm- A.

TRAU TmA

REAL PROPERTY
Rule Against Perpetuities in Trust Dispositions. By the enactment
of chapter 146, labeled by the code reviser "Trusts-Rule against
Perpetuities," Washington has joined the group of states deciding to
"wait-and-see" whether the actually developed facts involve remote
dispositions violating the Rule Against Perpetuities, rather than determining violations as the common law rule requires on the basis of possibilities, however unlikely to occur. This statute gives Washington
only a limited membership, however, for it is restricted to trust dispo-

